Show Notes

Quick Tip

Start improving your prayer life. Defending Catholic Christian ideas in conversation can be exhausting and defeating. We need to stay close to the Lord throughout this process.
Listen to Episode 22 of the Jeff Cavins Show for great information on how to hear God every day.

Show Outline

Reasons to Believe in God (part 2) focuses on a discussion of the Rationalist Proof of God. A detailed defense of this argument can be found in chapter 5 of Dr. Feser’s Five Proofs of the Existence of God.

Metaphysical Principles

Contingent beings: Beings that exist but did not have to exist.
The Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR): Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence.
- Inductive defense: We tend to find explanations when we look for them. Scientists don’t ever throw up their hands and say, “Well, maybe this phenomenon just has no explanation.”
- Deductive defense (reductio ad absurdum):
  - Denial of the PSR leads to radical skepticism about perceptual experiences.
  - Denial of the PSR leads to radical skepticism about our rational faculties, thereby making any such denial ultimately incoherent.
Quote from Pg. 149 – 150 of Five Proofs of the Existence of God (all emphases in the original)

Of course a determined critic of PSR might suppose he can bite the bullet and accept perceptual skepticism, but the Pruss/Koons line of argument can be pushed further than they push it. Consider that whenever we accept a claim that we take to be rationally justified, we suppose not only that we have a reason for accepting it (in the sense of a rational justification) but also that this reason is the reason why we accept it (in the sense of being the cause or explanation of our accepting it). We suppose that it is because the rational considerations in favor of the claim are good ones that we are moved to assent to the claim. We also suppose that our cognitive faculties track truth and standards of rational argumentation, rather than leading us to embrace conclusions in a way that has no connection to truth or logic. But if PSR is false, we could have no reason for thinking that any of this is really the case. For all we know, what moves or causes us to assent to a claim might have absolutely nothing to do with the deliverances of our cognitive faculties, and our cognitive faculties themselves might in turn have the deliverances they do in a way that has nothing to do with truth or standards of logic. We might believe what we do for no reason whatsoever, and yet it might also falsely seem, once again for no reason whatsoever, that we do believe what we do on good rational grounds. Now, this would apply to any grounds we might have for doubting PSR as much as it does to any other conclusion we might draw. Hence, to doubt or deny PSR undercuts any grounds we could have for doubting or denying PSR. The rejection of PSR is therefore self-undermining.

1st Version of a Contingency Argument (lumping)

Contingent beings exist.
Every contingent being A has an explanation for its existence (PSR).
Its explanation, call it B, is either contingent or necessary.
If B is necessary, we have arrived at a necessary being.
If B is contingent, then it has an explanation for its existence (PSR).
Its explanation, call it C, is either contingent or necessary.
If C is necessary, we have arrived at a necessary being.
If C is contingent, then it has an explanation for its existence (PSR).
The chain of contingent beings (i.e. A, B, C, D, and so on) is either finite or infinite.
If it is finite and terminates in a contingent being, then PSR is false (since the first contingent being would lack an explanation).
But the PSR is not false.
So, if the chain is finite it terminates in a non-contingent being i.e. a necessary being.
If the chain of contingent beings (i.e. A, B, C, D, and so on) is infinite, then the whole chain itself would constitute a contingent reality that needs to be explained.
That contingent reality (in premise 13) can be explained by another contingent being or a necessary being.
If it is explained by another contingent being Z, then that contingent being itself would require an explanation.
Its explanation, call it Z*, is either contingent or necessary.
If it is contingent, we have begun another chain such as the one mentioned in premise (9).
No finite or infinite series of contingent things ultimately explains why contingent being A exists.
Yet, contingent A (and B, C, D, and so on) do have ultimate explanations.
So, there must exist at least one non-contingent being (i.e. a necessary being) to account for the series of contingent beings (i.e. A, B, C, D, … Z*, and so on).
If a necessary being has potentials, then its potentials must be actualized by something else (principle of causality).
But if it’s potentials must be actualized by something else, then it would not be a necessary being. But we have shown that it is a necessary being.
Therefore, the necessary being is purely actual (i.e. devoid of any potentials).
That which is purely actual possesses the divine attributes.
So, there is a necessary being that possesses the divine attributes.
To say there is a necessary being that possesses the divine attributes is to say God exists.
Therefore, God exists.