Davies and Theodicy

Brian Davies O.P. wrote The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil (2006), and it is the best book I have ever read on the subject. Drawing upon the work of St. Thomas Aquinas and others in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, Davies defends many theses and covers a lot of ground.

He promotes some theses that sound odd to modern ears, especially those familiar with contemporary apologetics. He rejects all of the popular solutions to the problem of evil (i.e. theodicies). Some of the theodicies he critiques include:

• The Free-will defense (primarily Plantinga’s version)
• The “We can’t see all the picture” argument
• The soul-making theodicy (Hick)
• That evil is God’s just punishment
• That God suffers also

Davies invites us to suppose that God is a moral agent (like the rest of us) and that he is under moral suspicion. Would any of those defenses (or a combination of them) be enough to exonerate God? Davies answers in the negative and provides many reasons and examples. This may come to the shock of those who regularly employ such theodicies.

You may be wondering: if Davies rejects all of those theodicies, then what is his theodicy? Well, he does not provide one, and, he argues, nor does St. Thomas Aquinas. Moreover, he argues that the very project of theodicy is wrong-headed.

Following St. Thomas and others in his tradition, Davies argues that God is not a moral agent like we are.  When we reflect on the philosophical reasons to think God exists, as well as what we can deduce about his nature, we find that God is radically different from us. He is unlike anything in our everyday experience.

Because of these radical differences, one simply cannot critique God and indict him for bad behavior the way one critiques other human beings. It turns out, on Davies’ analysis, that the traditional problem of evil is a non-starter.

The Problem of Evil Revisited

Consider this ancient formulation of the problem of evil.

1. Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
2. Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
3. Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
4. Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?

 What is Davies’ answer to this? Draw your attention to question (2). Is God able to prevent evil but not willing? Theists typically answer, “Yes, but this does not make him malevolent.” Theodicy fans (i.e. “God’s friends” as Davies calls them) aim to show why God is morally justified in permitting evils. Davies has no intention of following them down that path.

Rather, he points out that the whole problem presupposes that God is a moral agent like we are and that he can be indicted by our ethical analyses. But God is radically unlike us.

If a human being is able to prevent evil in a particular situation and chooses not to do so, his morals can be called into question. Why? Because a human being acting as one ought to should aim to eliminate evils where possible and develop virtuous behavior. Now, consider applying that same analysis to God.

“God acting as a God ought to act ought to eliminate evils where possible and develop virtuous behavior.”

Notice the oddities in the statement. What does it mean for God to act as a God ought to? Such a notion might make some sense if we’re examining the finite gods of the Greeks, but it does not make sense when applied to the God of classical theism. Why is that?

First, we have no insight into what it means for the infinite God to act as He ought to, and it does not seem like such a notion is coherent. For who would obligate God to act in a certain way? Of course, some theists have spoken of God being “bound” by His nature, but this is akin to saying that God is bound to act as He acts and that nothing outside of Him can coerce or obligate Him.

Second, what is this business about God developing virtuous behavior? God, as Davies argues, undergoes no real change. He is perfect in Himself. He does not move from good to better. The notion of Him improving his behavior simply does not make sense.

Summary

So, we find that Epicurus’ series of questions articulating the problem of evil is fundamentally flawed when applied to the God of classical theism. It assumes God is a moral agent like us, which He is not, and indicts God based on human standards which do not apply to him.

In part 2, we consider the philosophical reasons for thinking God is not a moral agent.

Then, in part 3, we consider the biblical and historical reasons for thinking God is not a moral agent.

Finally, in part 4, we consider Davies’ approach to God’s causation and evil in the world.