Davies Responds to the Problem of Evil (Part 2)
“I don’t think the problem of evil is a very compelling argument at all when considered as an objection against God’s existence. Brian Davies would agree with that.” – Dr. Edward Feser (source)
In part 1 of this series, I summarized Brian Davies’ approach to the problem of evil. He concludes that the problem of evil is a non-starter as an argument against God’s existence. Frequently, arguments from evil assume that God is a moral agent like we are, subject to moral praise and censure. However, the God of classical theism differs from us radically, and he cannot be judged as a moral agent as we are judged.
In part 2 of this series, I summarize some of Davies’ reasons for thinking God is not a moral agent. If Davies is correct in his analysis, the problem of evil fails to get off the ground as a defeater of classical theism.
Philosophical Reasons
In chapter two, Davies treats us to a detailed Thomistic argument for God’s existence. He argues from a distinction between the existence of things and their nature to a creator in which essence and existence are united; this we call God. In his recent book, Five Proofs of the Existence of God, Dr. Edward Feser develops a Thomistic proof along similar lines. For an introduction to metaphysical arguments for God’s existence, see this.
Now, if Davies is right in his analysis of the God, then “God is pretty odd” (pg. 78). We don’t encounter anything like him in our everyday experience. Davies argues that:
1. God is the source of the existence of absolutely everything other than himself.
2. God is not an item in the universe.
3. God acts in or on what is not divine not as something external but as a source of existence.
4. God is not something the nature of which can be distinguished from the individual that it is.
5. God’s nature is to exist (or, God exists by nature).
6. God does not undergo (and cannot undergo) any real change. (pg. 78)
Now, given that God is radically different from human beings in the ways mentioned above, it follows that God is not a moral agent like human persons are. On page 92, Davies asks:
For how do we typically think of moral agents? Primarily, we think of them as people living in the world capable of acting well or badly.
Yet, it’s apparent on analysis that God is not like that; he’s not a created entity within the universe, but rather the source of the existence of everything that exists. Also, God cannot improve his behavior (acting better more often and badly less often) since He is immutable and does not change.
Support from Other Philosophers
Davies quotes R.F. Holland who makes the same point in a different way:
It makes sense for us to have or fail to have moral reasons for our doings and refrainings because as human beings we are members of a moral community . . . but God is not a member of a moral community or of any community. (quoted by Davies on pg. 104; R.F. Holland, Against Empiricism, 1980). [1]
Additionally, in a recent interview, Dr. Edward Feser summarizes Davies’ point nicely:
… it’s a mistake to think that [attributing goodness to God] entails that God is a kind of moral agent. One of the reasons that it’s a mistake is that the sorts of things that we usually attribute to moral agents are not intelligibly attributed to God. For example, we think of a moral agent as being courageous or being cowardly. Someone can intelligibly be said to be courageous or cowardly only because he faces certain dangers. Courage is a matter of doing the right thing in the face of danger, so that we attribute courage to someone precisely when he does that. But God is never in danger. God is outside time and space. God is immaterial, so he doesn’t have a body. There’s no such thing as God being wounded or in danger of getting a disease or in any other way capable of suffering any kind of harm. So it doesn’t make any sense to attribute to God a virtue like courage or, for that matter, to attribute to him a vice like cowardice. Concepts like these simply have no application to God. If we approach the problem of evil as a problem of how to justify God as a moral agent in the face of evil, we’re getting the conversation off on the wrong foot. (source)
The Burden of Proof
Some might disagree with our conclusion. They might say, “DeRosa is just following Davies blindly, but Davies is wrong. God is indeed a moral agent.”
At this point, it’s fair to shift the burden of proof to the person who thinks God is a moral agent. If that’s what they want to assert, then they owe us two things:
- A definition of a moral agent [2]
- An explanation of how the God of classical theism fits this definition
This burden weighs heavily on those proposing typical forms of the problem of evil. As we saw in part 1, typical versions of the problem presuppose that God is a moral agent like we are. Davies gives us strong philosophical reasons to reject that view.
The Courtroom & Theodicy
Popular versions of the problem of evil seem to prosecute God in the ethical courtroom and render a guilty verdict. This method fails. However, the illustration helps reiterate the difference between Davies’ approach and those who offer typical theodicies.
Theodicy defenders (i.e. “God’s friends” in Davies’ language) inform atheists that they have rendered an incorrect verdict. It’s not that they were wrong to adjudicate the case, but that they brought the charges unfairly and lack sufficient evidence to obtain a conviction. This gives the impression that if they had enough evidence, they could have won the case. But, given their epistemic position and failure to consider all of the relevant evidence, they reached an errant verdict.
Davies points out the incoherence of bringing God into a courtroom meant for human persons. He cannot be judged in that way, because He’s not the type of thing that courtroom is for. God is not a person like we are, and He is not a moral agent like we are. Using a slightly different analogy, Davies says:
Suppose I complain that a typical tennis player is not scoring many goals. You would rightly reply that tennis players are not in the business of scoring goals. That is what football [i.e. soccer] players are about. By the same token, so I am arguing we have reason to deny that God should be thought of as morally good or bad and we therefore have reason to deny that God is a moral agent. (pg. 104)
Conclusion
We cannot call God into the courtroom of human moral standards and declare him guilty. Nor can we acquit God of wrongdoing on the same basis. Human persons belong in our courtroom, not the incomprehensible, divine, creator of the universe.
God is not a moral agent, and any version of the problem of evil that presupposes otherwise is a non-starter. God is beyond us and above us. Not because he has a multitude of cool powers, but because He is the source and creator of everything that exists. He is “wholly other” and radically different from us. He is God, and we are not.
In part 3, we consider the biblical and historical reasons for thinking God is not a moral agent.
In part 4, we consider Davies’ approach to God’s causation and evil in the world.
End Notes
[1] Some might point out the Trinity consist of three persons who commune with each other and fully possess the divine nature. Yet, this does not negate Holland’s point. First, person, when used of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, does not mean the same thing as when used of human persons. Secondly, God does not exist alongside any other Gods. He is absolutely unique and transcends all categories. He’s not the instance of a kind, of some X. Rather, He is the source and creator of all things that exist as instances of a kind.
[2] Some might insist that we first provide our own definition of moral agency. For those who press this point, I am happy to put forth the following: A moral agent is a subject that chooses good or bad with respect to various duties, obligations, virtues, or vices. But, I also note the power of Davies’ account is that whatever definition one uses to capture human moral agency, we can show that this does not apply to the classical theistic conception of God.
){kind=link}
Hello. It seems to me that it is better to frame these questions in terms of metaphysical possibility than in terms of morality. Would you say there are certain actions that are logically but not metaphysically possible for God?
Hmm, good question, I’m not sure. Perhaps you can elaborate further?
I’m just wondering if classical theism is able to avoid all of the issues raised by the problem of evil. For example, one can ask if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity. If the theist says this would be metaphysically impossible for God, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be metaphysically possible for God can be discussed. If the theist says it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity, then the nontheist can ask if God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this. If the theist says God would not be worthy of worship if he had done this, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be prevent God from being worthy of worship can be discussed. If the theist says God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this, then the question of why God is worthy of worship can be discussed. It seems to me that classical theism does not make the problem of evil a non-starter.
Excellent questions, Liam! Let me think about these a bit and get back to you. Thanks for stopping by the website.
I might as well take a running stab at this. Too bad it is a late Post.
>I’m just wondering if classical theism is able to avoid all of the issues raised by the problem of evil. For example, one can ask if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity.
Scholastic don’t believe in “Libertarian Free Will” in the sense that view of free will presupposes Kantian metaphysics and Scholastics and other Thomist & Essentialists reject said metaphysics. Thomist presuppose the intellect moves the will to the good where as the Kantians & other voluntarists believe the Will moves the intellect and has primacy.
So we don’t believe God made that scheme of free will because that view of metaphysics is wrong.
If you rephrase the question to mean ” if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have free will and allow them to suffer for all eternity.” I would say no since God’s ontological and metaphysical goodness prevent Him from making an evil that is a final cause or end in and of itself.
In essence God cannot allow any evil to exist without bring good out of it.
> If the theist says this would be metaphysically impossible for God, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be metaphysically possible for God can be discussed.
Well Brian Davies does go out of his way to explain God cannot be considered good in any fashion if he allow evil to exist as an end in and of itself for no good reason whatsoever. God can create a water world with fish and allow a super nova to vaporize it five minutes after creating it. But God cannot create fish to live in a world without water just so he can watch them flop around till they sufficate.
There is a subtle distinction here.
God not being a moral agent does not mean God can do any evil or allow any and all evil without limits.
Thanks!
Hi Liam, sorry for the delay. I have a google doc open where I’ve typed some initial thoughts to your questions, but I’d like to do a little more research and try to make the reply more concise. I just wanted you to know I haven’t forgotten about your excellent questions!
Re: “I’m just wondering if classical theism is able to avoid all of the issues raised by the problem of evil.”
Let’s distinguish. Just because classical theism, on Davies’ analysis, is able to avoid some (or many) issues typically raised by the problem of evil, that does not imply it avoids all issues. In fact, his account raises quite a few metaphysical issues related to the nature of evil, God’s causation, and so forth, which he treats at length in his books. When I wrote these blog posts a few years ago, I may have been a bit too cavalier with the language which suggests to some that all problems are easily solved!
Re: “It seems to me that classical theism does not make the problem of evil a non-starter.”
So, perhaps it’s not right to talk about THE problem of evil (though I do use that language a lot). Rather, on the analysis of Davies, McCabe, Brown, etc., many renditions of the problem of evil do not get off the ground. In particular, they respond to charges implying God is a good moral agent not living up to the perfect standards of moral goodness as we judge them. However, that does not mean all problems are immediately solved and that no more questions can be asked. Also, it should be noted that other Catholics like Eleonore Stump and Trent Dougherty handle the problem of evil very differently from Fr. Davies. And, you happen to raise a very good series of questions! Let’s turn to that.
Re: For example, one can ask if it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity.
I suppose it would depend how you define libertarian freedom, but there are definitely many Christians (typically Calvinists) who would say not only this is metaphysically possible, but this is the world that God has created. Perhaps you instead mean a scenario like this:
Could God create a world of human beings with no freedom of any sort (libertarian, compatibilist, etc.) to make moral choices and punish them with suffering for all eternity?
I would say no. Of course, God has enough power in his omnipotence to bring about logically possible states of affairs, but he is also constrained by his rational nature. In other words, if something involves acting irrationally or a contradiction, then we can deny it’s something God can bring about. So, human beings who have no freedom is really a contradictory concept, since humans are rational animals who have some form of freedom.
Could God create a world of sub-human animals with no freedom of any sort and punish them with suffering for all eternity?
This scenario is more speculative and tricky, but again I would say no. In the chapter on good, evil, and causation, Fr. Davies that God only brings about what is good, and it’s within his prerogative to bring it about that good things curtail the goodness of other good things in our material world. For example, when God brings about lions that eat lambs, we have the goodness of lions curtailing the goodness of the lamb.
Now, since sub-rational animals do not have immortal souls, they do not by nature exist for all eternity (on a Thomistic analysis). So, it does not seem to make sense to speak of sub-human animals suffering for all eternity (since they do not exist for all eternity), nor does it make proper sense to speak of punishment (since non-rational animals don’t commit moral wrongs).
Of course, we can keep tweaking the scenarios: “Could God create a world…” and some of them we may be able to answer confidently and others more tentatively. The tenativeness of some answers will be due to the fact that we may not be able to see all of the ins and outs of different possible worlds, and if we could see all of the ins and outs, it may end up having something inherently irrational or contradictory in it.
Perhaps there’s an analogy to a mathematical idea, “There exists a set of all sets.” That seems quite reasonable to say. If there exist sets, then why couldn’t there be a big set that contained all the sets? However, even though it does not contain an obvious contradiction, it turns out on analysis to entail a contradiction, and therefore, we know there cannot be “a set of all sets.”
Re: If the theist says this would be metaphysically impossible for God, then whether or not making the world the way it is would be metaphysically possible for God can be discussed.
If the classical theist arguments for God are correct, then we find ourselves in a world made by God. And if that’s so, then this world clearly is metaphysically possible for him to create (since he created it!). Of course, someone can question the warrant for classical theism. But, Fr. Davies argues that most typical problems of evil do not count against the view (and I agree).
Re: “If the theist says it is metaphysically possible for God to create beings who do not have libertarian freedom and allow them to suffer for all eternity, then the nontheist can ask if God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this.”
So, as I mentioned above, many Christians (typically Calvinists) think God did just this and he is worthy of worship. Why is he so worthy? Typical answers might include that he is Holy, Good, and the creator of all creaturely goodness. However, as classical theists, we would not claim any deep insight into God’s mysterious divinity. We can say it’s true that he is Holy and Good (and we can predicate things of God analogously), but we don’t have a strong grasp on what God’s holiness and goodness actually are because they transcend our finite categories.
Re: “If the theist says God would still be worthy of worship if he had done this, then the question of why God is worthy of worship can be discussed.”
Yes, that can definitely be discussed. But for the classical theist, the reason God is worthy of worship will involve both that He is goodness itself and that He has created us as the type of creatures who find our fulfillment in relationship with Him. But, as Fr. Davies argues, the “goodness itself” does not mean the same thing as “human moral goodness.”
Thanks again for these questions, Liam, as they have reminded me I need to research these ideas further. I hope to do some more writing on these topics and update the blog in the future.
But isn’t God good? And isn’t goodness a moral value? I agree with the idea that God is not subject to human morality… He is God after all, and “playing God” is actually immoral for a human. But He has a good and holy character. And his moral commands to humans are outflows of his character. To claim that He is neither good nor evil (or have no morality) does not seem to fit the biblical description of God, IMHO.
Good question, Chavoux. On Davies’ account, God is indeed good, but his goodness need not be construed as moral goodness like that of an agent who behaves well with respect to various duties, virtues, or obligations. I also agree there are ways to affirm God’s holy and good character (his righteousness, justice, etc.) as Scripture does without committing to the idea that he’s a perfectly well-behaving moral agent. Instead, we can construe God’s goodness as an infinite metaphysical goodness. I say a little more about your objection in this video starting at 7:55 https://youtu.be/BK5ENwX-SOc?t=475
Parts 3 and 4 seem not to exist!
If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so,God acts as a moral agent. Just not a Good one.
The Bible, supposedly a revelation from God claims God is good, fair, just, compassionate, merciful, is love and is righteous. Thus the attributes of God supposedly from a trustworthy revelation from god tells us God is like us in having and understanding these attributes. The Bible also repeatedly tell us God approves of these moral attributes, and gives commands to be like wise. With examples of what that means. See Isaiah 1 for an example.
Thus we end up redefining God, Good, moral agent, compassionate, merciful fair et al. Similar to this is the related claim God owes us no moral obligations. Compassion,mercy etc means accepting moral obligations to God’s creations.
Thanks, William, for the comment. Some brief replies:
Re: “If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so, God acts as a moral agent.”
What do you mean by ‘moral agent’ here?
Re: “The Bible, supposedly a revelation from God claims God is good, fair, just, compassionate, merciful, is love and is righteous. Thus the attributes of God supposedly from a trustworthy revelation from god tells us God is like us in having and understanding these attributes.”
That these are used in divine revelation mean its appropriate to speak about God in these ways and as having these attributes *in some sense*. But, it doesn’t follow that God is “like us” in the sense that he has the attributes *just like we do*. Classical theists often explain that we speak about God analogously. See this episode here for more on that: http://www.clasicaltheism.com/analogy
Re: “The Bible also repeatedly tell us God approves of these moral attributes, and gives commands to be like wise. With examples of what that means.”
This is fully compatible with God not being a moral agent in the sense that Davies argues.
A moral agent is a conscious agent who can act morally. Either eliminating a great moral evil, or refusing to do so even if it is in that agent’s power to do so.
We are told that God authored the Bible. Council Of Trent, Session Four and Verbum Dei – 1965.
We are told God is good including numerous sub-goodnesses. Merciful, compassionate, And the bible has numerous verses telling us God wants us to have these subgoodness. The Bible repeatedly tells us what these sub-goodneses mean. Isaiah 1, Luke 6 and many other verses. Thus these sub-goodnesses cannot not be claimed to be some attributes mere humans cannot understand. Not when applied to God. The Bible makes these sub-goodnesses explicit. And tells us these are attributes of the biblical God.
We cannot argue then that these sub-goodness are figurative, metaphorical, or not univocal. We cannot claim these attributes must be understood analogically as some theologians claim. Merciful does not mean analogically not merciful, compassionate not compassionate.
And to be compassionate or merciful is to accept moral obligations. Thus, the God of the Bible has moral obligations, and no matter how God acts or refuses to act, God is indeed a moral agent.
Theology cannot solve the Problem Of Evil with these sorts of word games.
Hi William,
Thanks for the engagement. My thought on this has developed somewhat in the few years since I wrote these blog posts. I do intend to update them (or do an update episode/writing on the topic). Feel free to follow-up then on those new posts when they occur.
Re: A moral agent is a conscious agent who can act morally.
I don’t deny that, but it’s not super informative. What do you mean by conscious agent? What do you mean by “act morally”? One of the keys to the move I’m making in the article (and Davies is making) is that even if you want to say God “acts morally”, the import of that phrase is going to be radically different for God than it is for human creatures.
Re: “We are told that God authored the Bible.”
Amen. But the Bible uses a wide variety of language about God. Some language is undoubtedly metaphorical and non-literal (e.g. “God’s nostrils” and “God’s bowels” referred to in Psalms).
Re: “We are told God is good including numerous sub-goodnesses. Merciful, compassionate, And the bible has numerous verses telling us God wants us to have these subgoodness. The Bible repeatedly tells us what these sub-goodneses mean. Isaiah 1, Luke 6 and many other verses. Thus these sub-goodnesses cannot not be claimed to be some attributes mere humans cannot understand. Not when applied to God. The Bible makes these sub-goodnesses explicit. And tells us these are attributes of the biblical God.
We cannot argue then that these sub-goodness are figurative, metaphorical, or not univocal. We cannot claim these attributes must be understood analogically as some theologians claim. Merciful does not mean analogically not merciful, compassionate not compassionate.”
You assert that we cannot argue this but do not explain why. Why can’t the Bible use analogical language? Dr. James Dolezal provides a look at Biblical language about God in this recent episode. If you’d like, I’d recommend listening to that episode and then responding in the comments beneath it if you want to pursue this topic of Biblical language about God.
Peace,
John
“If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so,God acts as a moral agent. Just not a Good one.”
But this assumes two things:
1. God is not acting to eliminate horrendous moral evil. As a Christian I would argue that in Jesus Christ, his perfect life, and death and resurrection through which He started his Kingdom on earth, God has indeed acted to eliminate horrendous moral evil – and is continuing to do so: every sinner that repents and becomes a follower of Jesus Christ is one bit less of horrendous moral evil in this world.
2. Eliminating horrendous moral evil is something that can and should be done immediately without having any undesirable consequences. In the words of God through his prophet:
“Say to them, As I live, declares the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn back, turn back from your evil ways, for why will you die?” To eliminate all moral evil also implies that all moral agents of evil (human beings) be removed. And on the day that this happens, the time for repentance, forgiveness, change, turning back to God, will be past forever. As long as God allows evil-doers the opportunity to turn to Him and change, He logically has to allow them to do both good or evil, as they choose.
Re:If God could eliminate horrendous moral evil and does not act to do so,God acts as a moral agent. Just not a Good one.
This is just logically absurd. So if Michael Jordan could play a good Football game and does not act to do so Michael Jordan acts as a football player just not a good one?
This statement is just incoherent if not absurd. If Michael Jordan is not a football player then he doesn’t as one, good or bad. If God is not a moral agent in the univocal way a maximally virtuous creature is a moral agent then God cannot act as either a good or bad moral agent.
Sophistry does not help here.
Michael Jordan is not omnipotent. We are told God is. Foolish category mistake.
Michael Jordan is not omnipotent. We are told God is. Foolish category mistake. Michael Jordan might have a good excuse for a bad game. God never does