Facing the Problem of Evil (Part 2)
In part 1, we examined how to situate the problem of evil in conversation. While we can pray for the person and empathize when people face the emotional problem of evil, we want to have answers when they tackle the intellectual problem.
Recall two subdivisions of the intellectual problem: the logical problem of evil and the evidential problem of evil. Proponents of the logical problem argue that evil and suffering prove God cannot possibly exist. God and evil are strictly incompatible.
Proponents of the evidential problem argue that evil and suffering demonstrate the unlikelihood of God’s existence. Given the evil we observe, we probably inhabit a godless universe.
With these ideas in mind, let’s answer the challenge.
The Logical Problem
Those pressing the logical problem of evil need to show it is impossible that God exists given the evil and suffering in the world. Many scholars have abandoned this view. Alvin Plantinga reports:
At present, however, it is widely conceded that there is nothing like straightforward contradiction or necessary falsehood in the joint affirmation of God and evil; the existence of evil is not logically incompatible (even in the broadly logical sense) with the existence of an all-powerful, all-knowing, and perfectly good God. [Plantinga, Knowledge and Christian Belief, p. 117]
Why exactly have they abandoned the logical problem? Recall the famous Epicurean formulation:
Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him God?
We can reformulate the argument as follows:
- An all-powerful God has the ability to prevent all evil and suffering.
- A good God would always want to prevent evil and suffering.
- Yet, evil and suffering are perennially present in our world.
- Therefore, a good, all-powerful God cannot exist.
Proponents of the logical problem often appeal to disturbing examples of extreme evil to strengthen their case. While those examples might tug at our emotions, they do not improve the logic. It happens that (2) is false: a good God may not always want to prevent evil and suffering.
A Missing Premise
In fact, the argument ignores a key premise that many Catholic Christians hold dear:
(5) God has morally sufficient reasons for the evil and suffering in our world.
For the logical problem of evil to succeed, it must be shown that (5) is false. In other words, that God cannot possibly have morally sufficient reasons for the evil and suffering in our world. While atheists might reply, “Oh yeah, what’s the reason for this or that terribly tragedy? It’s just a pointless case of evil and suffering.”
Catholic Christians can respond as Timothy Keller does here:
Just because you can’t see or imagine a good reason why God might allow something doesn’t mean there can’t be one. [Keller, The Reason for God, p. 23]
By pointing out that it is possible for God, evil, and suffering to coexist, the believer evades the logical problem. If the unbeliever still maintains that God and evil are strictly incompatible, he needs an argument for this. How does he know that?
How does he know it’s impossible for an all-powerful, good God to have morally sufficient reasons for the evil and suffering in our world? This burden of proof has never been met.
Conclusions
Catholic philosopher Edward Feser sums up the situation well in this blog article:
I have argued that the existence of even the worst evils gives us absolutely no reason whatsoever to doubt the existence and goodness of the God of classical theism. In that sense the problem of evil poses no intellectual difficulty for theism. But I have also insisted that evil poses an enormous practical difficulty, because while we can know with certainty that God has a reason for allowing the evil He does, we are very often simply not in a position to know what that reason is in this or that particular case.
Feser continues:
We can know some of the general ways in which good can be drawn out of evil – our free choices have a significance that they would not have otherwise; we can make of our sufferings an opportunity for penance for the sins we have committed; we are able to develop moral virtues such as patience, gratitude, courage, compassion, and so forth – but we cannot expect always to know why this specific child was allowed to be raped and murdered or that specific village was allowed to be destroyed by an earthquake.
Our Updated Flow Chart
Next post, we’ll consider the evidential problem of evil.
){kind=link}
God is Love. Love wills what is good for the Other. What is good/desirable for the Other is to be happy. So God, if He is God, would will our happiness. He would put us in Heaven right from the get-go. Logically, any suffering would be a waste, for there is a possible world without our suffering in it. Logical and loving beings don’t allow Others to suffer needlessly.
The argument from evil is sound.
I’ve also laid out a ten day gauntlet on Edward Feser. He needs to respond to my refutation of his new book —
http://acidtriponpluto.webs.com/Feserfatality.pdf | https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9vzpd7WASLI
Given the soundness of the logical argument from evil, the evidential argument is a waste of everyone’s time. ….. As if a moral virtue like bravery is worth a child being thrown into a gas chamber. Disgusting.
Re: God is Love. Love wills what is good for the Other. What is good/desirable for the Other is to be happy. So God, if He is God, would will our happiness.
Ok, I’m tracking here.
Re: He would put us in Heaven right from the get-go.
Maybe, but He chose not to. From what premises does it follow that God is obligated to do this? Where would this obligation come from? What if God wants to demonstrate His justice by punishing the guilty and His love by offering salvation to all? Later in this series I offer some additional thoughts from a Christian worldview.
Re: Logically, any suffering would be a waste, for there is a possible world without our suffering in it.
This is asserted, but what’s the argument? Why can’t it be simultaneously true that for any suffering X, (1) there is possible world without X, (2) X is not “a waste”, and (3) God permits X.
I submit that when you make the premises of any logical problem of evil clear, the problem dissolves. Of course, that does not erase the emotional problem.
“From what premises does it follow that God is obligated to do this? ”
It’s not an obligation. It’s a logical entailment of God’s loving nature. God is loving, and Love wants what is best for the beloved, and what is best is happiness.
“What if God wants to demonstrate His justice by punishing the guilty and His love by offering salvation to all?”
What is the purpose of “justice”? Punishing the “guilty” does not undo the harm they did. You can torture Hitler forever, but the Holocaust will remain an eternal mark on history. Punishment is a stupid, primitive idea. Also, there is no such as free will. No one is guilty in the moral sense of the word.
It is also questionable if demonstrating justice to evil men is worth the torment that it causes to little boys and girls. “Oh little girl, I’m gonna let that man rape you, so I can punish him later on!”
X is a waste because there is a possible world where it does not occur. If you can make a child happy without having him tortured first, then letting him be tortured would be a waste; it would be unnecessary. That is not compatible with being a loving caretaker/parent. Similarly, for God to allow suffering when He could easily put us in Heaven right away is wasteful.
“I submit that when you make the premises of any logical problem of evil clear, the problem dissolves.” No it doesn’t.