In part 1, we examined how to situate the problem of evil in conversation. In part 2, we answered the logical problem of evil. We saw that the logical version poses no threat whatsoever to the existence of the God of classical theism.

Paul Draper, an agnostic scholar, says that “theists face no serious logical problem of evil” (Pain and pleasure: An evidential problem for theists, 1989). J.L. Mackie, a famous atheist philosopher, said that “the problem of evil does not, after all, show that the central doctrines of theism are logically consistent with one another” (The Miracle of Theism: Arguments for and against the existence of God, 1982). [Both citations taken from Answering Atheism by Trent Horn, p. 87.]

In part 3, we shift our focus to the evidential problem of evil.

The Evidential Problem of Evil

Proponents of the evidential problem hold that some evils make it highly unlikely that a good God exists. Some formulate the argument like this:

• If pointless evils exist, then God does not exist.
• Pointless evils do exist.
• Therefore, God does not exist.

The atheist argues probabilistically for premise (2) i.e. pointless evils probably do exist. This leads to the probabilistic conclusion: therefore, God probably does not exist.

As you may expect, the argument hinges on premise (2). What evidence supports the atheist claim that pointless evils exist? Usually, the skeptic presents various instances of terrible evil, and then concludes that the evils are clearly pointless.

For example, an out of control forest fire burns dozens of helpless deer to death. A tsunami wipes out half the population of a particular island. A 5 year-old dies after a painful bout with cancer.

The reality of gut-wrenching evil assists the atheist in making this argument. We theists cannot deny that terrible evil exists. However, when having a discussion about the intellectual problem, we must press the atheist with a question.

The Key Question

How do you know those evils are probably pointless? The typical answer is that they just seem to us to be pointless. We cannot explain most cases of seemingly pointless evil. However, it does not follow that the evils are truly pointless.

God very well may have morally sufficient reasons for the evil in the world. If He does, then the evils are not pointless. It turns our that the question of pointless evil depends on whether God exists or not.

If God does not exist, then there clearly are pointless evils. If God does exist, then pointing to seemingly pointless evils does not show they are actually pointless. This suffices to show that the probabilistic problem of evil on its own fails to provide a good reason to think God does not exist.

Our Finite Limitations

The butterfly effect refers to the concept that small things in the present lead to enormous effects in the long run. To take a simplistic example: A butterfly flapping its wings might change the weather pattern on a battlefield which changes the outcome of a war and changes the course of human history for the next 100 years.

Chaos theory, a branch of mathematics, focuses on analyzing such behavior. Again, the main point: one small change ripples through time, leading to future effects of extraordinary magnitude.

How does this relate to the evidential problem of evil?

The Connection

Human beings cannot see the future. Heck, human beings cannot even see the present. We are largely ignorant of what happens in 99.9% of the world on a daily basis. We don’t know the ins and outs of how a mere dozen of our neighbors impact the world. Assessing all of the causal influences and effects of over seven billion people is a hopeless endeavor.

Since we cannot even fully comprehend the present, and we are entirely ignorant of the future, we are in no position to render judgments about the pointless nature of evils. This does not prove there are pointless evils are a myth, but it does demonstrate that we simply are in no position to judge if evils are truly pointless.

For example, suppose a house catches fire in the middle of the night, killing a newborn baby and her parents. To us, this appears a pointless evil. However, our limited epistemic situation prevents us from assessing all of the effects and influences of this event. As William Lane Craig notes:

The brutal murder of an innocent man or a child’s dying of leukemia could produce a sort of ripple effect through history such that God’s morally sufficient reason for permitting it might not emerge until centuries later and perhaps in another land. When you think of God’s providence over the whole of history, I think you can see how hopeless it is for limited observers to speculate on the probability that God could have a morally sufficient reason for permitting a certain evil. We’re just not in a good position to assess such probabilities. [Reasonablefaith.org, see this article]

Wrapping Up

We have situated the problem of evil and answered it (see the complete flow chart below). Nonetheless, Catholic Christians must recognize that although we can answer the intellectual problems surrounding evil, the practical problem of real pain and suffering deeply disturbs many.

Yet, I contend that the Catholic Christian worldview provides the antidote for those haunted by pain and misery. I develop that claim claim in the next post of this series.