A Reply to Mullins’ Reply to Feser
Background
Ryan Mullins wrote an essay critiquing divine simplicity at Theopolis. Edward Feser replied to Mullins’ critique, drawing upon material he used in Five Proofs of the Existence of God. Other philosophers and theologians also addressed Mullins’ essay. Mullins then replied to Feser and other critics.
Mullins’ latest reply does not properly engage with the distinctions Feser makes. Additionally, Mullins makes several assertions that are either non-sequiturs or misleading. Particularly, his essay misapplies a quote from Aquinas in the Summa Contra Gentiles. In this short article, I explain these problems while focusing on one problematic section of Mullins’ reply.
My response presupposes one has already read Feser’s reply to Mullins. I do not fault Mullins for brevity as there were spatial limits to what he could cover. Rather, I focus on the content of what he asserts. Moreover, one should note that Feser describes Mullins’ critique of divine simplicity as “admirably clear.”
My Response
Mullins says:
“This distinction between real and Cambridge properties has nothing to do with Morris’ argument. As T.J. Mawson points out, God’s act of creating the universe is nothing remotely like a Cambridge property.”
I am interested in what T.J. Mawson has to say, but since we are not told what he argues, we can only comment on his conclusion. What Mullins relays from Mawson may be technically correct but is irrelevant to Feser’s point. Here’s why.
Mullins says, “God’s act of creating the universe is nothing remotely like a Cambridge property.” This is true in a sense, but it obscures the issue. One might say God’s action is intrinsic to God, which means God’s ‘act of creating’ is not a Cambridge property.
But, God’s ‘having created the world’ or ‘becoming the creator of the world’ is a Cambridge property (or Cambridge change) since it requires no intrinsic change in God. When God creates, all change takes place on the side of creation.
So, we can agree with Mullins and Mawson that God’s ‘act of creating’ is not a Cambridge property, while denying that this entails anything interesting, since God’s ‘having created’ or God’s ‘becoming the creator’ is indeed a Cambridge change. Next, I draw another distinction to make the main point more clear.
Mullins says,
“Divine actions are intrinsic to God. Given divine simplicity, divine actions are identical to God. Divine actions like creating the universe or giving grace are not Cambridge properties because they are intrinsic to God, and identical to God.”
The last sentence does not follow. From the fact that divine actions are intrinsic to God, it does not follow that the contingent effects resulting from divine actions are intrinsic to God. Classical Theists hold that God’s action of creating can be intrinsic to him while the creation he brings about is not intrinsic to him.
Gaven Kerr makes this distinction clear in his recent book:
“Whilst there is no real distinction between the power to create and the act of creating, there is such a distinction between the act of creating and the product of that act, i.e. the effect that God brings about. This is because God’s power, whilst not the principle of God’s action (for in Him power and action are identical), is a principle of the thing made.” (emphasis mine) [1]
So, we distinguish between God’s act (intrinsic) and the product of that act (extrinsic). Also, Bernard Lonergan helps us clarify the distinction:
“God is immutable. He is entitatively identical whether he creates or does not create. His knowledge or will or production of the created universe adds only a relatio rationis [mental relation] to the actus purus [pure act]. They are predications by extrinsic denomination.” [2]
Again, we see a distinction between God’s unchanging knowledge or will (intrinsic) and the production of the created universe (extrinsic). Classical Theists (like Kerr, Lonergan, and Feser) maintain that God’s action can have contingent effects that are brought about outside of God. Mullins does not seem to interact with the distinction I describe.
An Imperfect Illustration
An illustration may make the distinction more vivid. Suppose a storm knocks out the power at your home. Through the use of a generator, you retain power. The generator powers the refrigerator, television, ceiling fan, and desktop computer. We might say the one simple action of generating power is intrinsic to the generator.
Nonetheless, that action brings it about that a multitude of different appliances outside of the generator are powered. The refrigerator, television, ceiling fan, and desktop computer acquire the property of ‘being powered by the generator’ but this is more like a Cambridge property, since change occurs with the appliances being turned on (extrinsic), rather than inside the generator.
The illustration is imperfect for at least two reasons. First, generators require intermediaries to bring power to appliances, whereas God creates through no intermediaries. Second, generators might be kicked into a higher or lower gear based on how many appliances are powered, whereas God has no higher or lower gear. However, the illustration serves to motivate the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction and how that relates to the notion of a Cambridge change. Next, let’s turn to Aquinas.
Mullins Cites Aquinas
Mullins says,
“As Thomas Aquinas makes clear, “The manifold actions ascribed to God, as intelligence, volition, the production of things, and the like, are not so many different things, since each of these actions in God is His own very being, which is one and the same thing.” (Summa Contra Gentiles II.10) I have emphasized the production of things because it is important to note that God’s causal activity of producing the universe and of producing grace in sinners are actions which are identical to God given divine simplicity.”
Notice the focus on “God’s causal activity” (i.e. God’s action) without a hint of the possibility that such activity can have contingent effects. One might wonder if this is a distinction that Aquinas is aware of, given Mullins citation and comment. Turn to the Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Section 1 for the answer:
“There are, however, two sorts of operation, as Aristotle teaches in Metaphysics IX: one that remains in the agent and is a perfection of it, as the act of sensing, understanding, and willing; another that passes over into an external thing, and is a perfection of the thing made as a result of that operation, the acts of heating, cutting and building, for example.” (emphasis mine)
Aquinas takes this distinction from Aristotle and applies it to God in the very next paragraph, “Now, both kinds of operation belong to God: the former, in that He understands, wills, rejoices, and loves; the latter, in that He brings things into being, preserves them, and governs them.” (emphasis mine) [3]
This distinction supplies a framework for handling discussions of God’s action and creation throughout the Summa Contra Gentiles. While Mullins does not misquote or misinterpret Aquinas, he fails to mention the distinction between action that remains in God (intrinsic) and action as it “passes over into an external thing” (extrinsic).
He concludes that Aquinas holds God’s actions, including the production of things, are identical to God. While true, this ignores the distinction between God’s immanent action and God’s action as it results in extrinsic effects. Yet, it is precisely this distinction that allows Aquinas to maintain the necessity of God’s being and the contingency of creation. Hence, Mullins misapplies Aquinas.
A Brief Note of a Deeper Worry
Perhaps Mullins is aware of the distinctions I make, yet rejects them as inappropriate appeals to mystery. After all, in the created order, if we have one and the same action, it produces one and the same effect (holding all circumstances and environmental factors constant). If everything about an action is exactly the same, it’s hard to see how the action could possibly result in different effects.
Despite this, proponents of absolute divine simplicity typically hold all three of the following propositions:
- God is absolutely necessary.
- God’s one, simple, unchanging act is absolutely necessary (as it is identical to God).
- God’s one, simple, unchanging, absolutely necessary act can freely produce a myriad of contingent effects outside of God.
The denier of divine simplicity may simply contend that (3) is implausible. After all, in the created order, we do not see anything like (3). However, the Classical Theist has no problem affirming the uniqueness of God’s causality and action. So, if one already has good reasons to hold to divine simplicity, then one is predisposed to find (3) plausible. [4]
Fr. Michael Dodds O.P. gives a clear statement of (3):
“We have seen that in God there is only one act of will–the act by which God wills his own goodness, an act that is one with God’s very being (esse). In that one act (in a way we don’t understand), God wills both his goodness and the participation of his goodness by creatures. It is possible, however, to distinguish in that one act a relation (habitudo) of the divine will to itself and to other things. Its relation to itself is natural, but its relation to other things is free.” [5]
Some might pursue the plausibility of (3) by suggesting models of situations where one and the same cause (holding all circumstances and environmental factors constant) produces different effects. Alexander Pruss has proposed a version of libertarian freedom as such a model [6]. Others have suggested the spontaneous radioactive decay or non-decay of atoms may provide such a model [7]. Examining these particulars goes beyond the scope of this essay.
At the very least, the proponent of divine simplicity can maintain (3) based on other prior commitments and thus remove the contradiction Mullins draws.
Conclusion
Finally, Mullins says:
“Any mention of Cambridge properties from Feser here is quite simply a category mistake. It is nothing but hand-waving. Morris’ argument, and others like it, are far more serious than Feser lets on.”
Cambridge properties are relevant in the ways previously explained. Feser is not making a category mistake nor engaging in hand-waving. In fact, it is Mullins’ reply that lacks engagement with the distinctions I outlined. Of course, stringent space requirements may have prevented such engagement.
Nonetheless, I hope this essay amplifies Feser’s point and allows critics of the doctrine of divine simplicity to engage Feser, Lonergan, Dodds, Kerr et al. in a clearer fashion.
Notes
[1] Kerr, Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation, chapter 2. I have an electronic version and do not have the official page reference. I quote the statement attached to footnote #44.
[2] Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, 105. The quote is from Dwight Stanislaw’s master’s thesis De Artiface Divino: A Thomistic Account of God’s Creative Act, 43.
[3] Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Book II, Section 1, paragraph 3.
[4] In this pdf, I provide some reasons to be a Classical Theist and proponent of divine simplicity.
[5] Dodds, The Unchanging God of Love, 179.
[6] Pruss, On Three Problems of Divine Simplicity.
[7] I learned of this suggestion from Christopher Tomaszewski. Tomaszewski has published his own journal article responding to the modal collapse argument.
God can’t know the future, so Its knowledge changes. If “Mullins reply to Feser on 8/26” is true right now, then Mullins can’t do otherwise without falsifying the truth value of the sentence. To be free, “Mullins reply…” would have to be false (or neither true nor false), then becomes true if and when Mullins replies to Feser on 8/26. Since it becomes true, it seems to me there is a change and/or succession in God’s intellect (in God, therefore). This suggests to me that even if I (a layman, mind you) can’t pinpoint exactly what goes wrong in Thomist arguments, there must be something wrong at the root of it. If I’m right, the true debate is between open theism and atheism. That is, unless the Thomist wants to reject libertarian free will and say we are all puppets of Pure Act.
If you’re like Feser, you’re a presentist. So you can’t use the “the future is already seen by God” line.
Hi Raphael,
Thanks for the comment. I’d invite you to spell out your argument more clearly regarding God not knowing the future and so forth.
Here’s a deductive argument:
P1. If Vinny has libertarian free will at a certain time, say t5, then the next moment t6 can have his selecting A or B.
2. At t5, a possible world obtains wherein (, or v6) is true. Vinny exists in this world.
3. It is impossible that v6 is true, yet Vinny does B at t6.
4. Vinny does not have access to a moment where he selects B. (given 2 & 3)
The next moment has to be consistent with what was true beforehand.
C. Vinny is not free. (given 1 & 4)
It’s not as if Vinny, existing at t5 where v6 is true, can cross to a different possible world where v6 is false. He is glued inside the possible world he is in.
This is not to say it impossible that Vinny does B. There is a possible world where v6 is false. But in the world where v6 obtains before t6 occurs, doing B is not accessible to Vinny. Only under the following two scenarios is Vinny free —
1. and are both not-yet-determined, then become true/false based on the choice.
2. and are both (variably) false before t6, then at t6, one of them becomes invariably true based on the choice.
So instead of a possible world obtaining, what you have is a possible world-fragment that continually has world-slices added on.
I’m sorry, but I’m having trouble following the argument. Can you maybe fix the notation and post it again?
Also, what is the relevance of this argument to the post?
It removed the bracketed text.
v6 = “Vinny do A at t6”
v6n = “Vinny not do A at t6”
So at the bottom, you read it as “v6 and v6n” are both whatever.
I agree that God’s intrinsic ‘act’ can be the same regardless of its contingent effects, and this helps make sense of how God’s ‘act of creation’ – willing himself – is the same intrinsically regardless of what is actually created. But does this work to describe God’s knowledge of the world? It seems to me that knowing X is an intrinsic state, in as much that it implies something analogous to an interior consciousness/awareness that would be different if something else was known. While the thing known might be external to God, and perhaps in some sense that proposition that ‘God know x contingent fact’ might be external to God, isn’t God’s conscious awareness/feeling that ‘X is the case’ at least intrinsic to God? And isn’t feeling aware that ‘X is the case’ different to feeling aware ‘not-X is the case?’ (and if not, is this a coherent account of knowledge?) is this feeling intrinsic or extrinsic to God?
(I meant to begin by thanking you for producing this helpful and straightforward article! Thank you)
Hi David,
Thanks for the kind words. Regarding your question, as a Classical Theist who follows the work of Fr. Brian Davies OP, I would deny that God has anything like conscious feeling/awareness that we’re familiar with. Yes, we can speak of God knowing, but God knows all things through the simple act of knowing Himself. This includes knowledge of contingent effects that are brought about outside of God. But feel free to ask a follow-up so I can fully grapple with your question more. Thanks for the comment!
Hi John
Apologies to only just respond to this – I’m afraid I hadn’t realised this had been picked up on (and probably wasn’t expecting it too given that I was responding to an older blog entry – thank you for engaging!)
My first thought is that it seems to me that the act that God knows all things ‘through’ himself needs unpacking. I agree that God does not seed a separate act of vision in order to ‘look’ at the world in order to know: God just knows what God is doing, which is producing the world. But it still seems to me that what God is *doing* could be different, and that, likewise, what God is *believing*, or aware of, course be different, and that this appears to imply a difference in God’s act.
I accept that we cannot imagine what it is like to be God, or to comprehend God’s thoughts. But it still seems to me that we must at least assert that God is conscious in some sense – or at least that God is ‘aware’. Is that not what omnipotence is, after all – total and absolute awareness?
On this point I have heard it argued that statements about God’s knowledge of the world is something that is only true by ‘extrinsic denomination’. So we might say that the sun is intrinsically hot, but the sentence ‘the sun heats the earth’ or ‘the sun makes the plant grow’ do not imply some intrinsic difference in the sun, but simply a difference in the external world. The sun is the same in every possible world, regardless of whether it heats the earth or not. Likewise, we might say that ‘God knows X contingent fact’ does not imply a difference in God, and that God is intrinsically the same across possible worlds, regardless of what God knows.
Now the problem I have with this view – or at least the thing that seems counter-intuitive – is that it seems to me that awareness, knowledge, is intrinsic in the way that ‘heats some external things’ is not. And that therefore believing X is just a different internal, intrinsic mental state to believing not-X. I know God’s knowledge is only analogous to the way we know, but if we ultimately end up saying something like God’s knowledge is the same regardless of what God knows, or that God’s awareness is the same regardless of what he is aware of, I am not sure whether this account of knowledge is coherent, and I am therefore not sure whether this can really describe the divine omniscience. Basically, it seems that being aware of X is not an intrinsically identical state to being aware of not-X. Or perhaps that is not the right way to think about knowledge?
Just to add, it seems that there is some disagreement amongst Thomists here. For example, Eleanor Stump, in Aquinas, (pages 111-113) argues that the contingency of the world’s events means that there is contingency in what God knows, and that this implies there is something intrinsic to God that varies across possible worlds, in the sense that those aspects (i.e. God being aware of X rather than not-X) would be different were the world to have been different. She just denies that these count as true ‘accidents’ under Aquinas scheme, on the basis that these are known atemporally and so there is no actual ‘change’ in God. I suppose one could argue that from the atemporal divine perspective, the distinction between necessary/possible do not quite apply, given that from eternity everything is fixed.
But of course many others disagree and feel even this kind of ‘theoretical’ or ‘logically could be different’ intrinsic differences count as an accident and would therefore be a violation of simplicity, in which case one is faced with the issues I have sketched out above.
The embrace of (3) at the end is fatal to sovereignty of God. Thomists not only claim that the effects are different, but also that God is in control of them. But this is incompatible with (3).
Note how the analogy of the spontaneous radioactive decay does not work here: in this phenomenon it is accepted that NOTHING controls (determines) the outcome, hence the word ‘spontaneous’. But thomists want to have God in control! In other words, they believe that:
In a possible world A different from a possible world B there is a reason why it is world A and not world B.
In a possible world B different from a possible world A there is a reason why it is world B and not world A.
Note that the reasons must be different. Now, the question is whether the reason is instrinsic to God or extrinsic. If it is intrinsic, then God is different in those two worlds; if it is extrinsic, then he is not in control. Obviously, God’s will to create cannot be the same as his will to not create, so the reason cannot be his will; his desire to actualize world A cannot be the same as his desire to actualize world B, so it cannot be the matter of his desires; and so on and so forth. Either the choice is internal (so God is not identical in those two worlds) or it is not his choice at all.
Thanks, Jabberwock, for another important comment. You are correct that Thomists affirm the sovereignty of God, so an objection that threatened this would indeed be problematic.
I mentioned radioactive decay and libertarian freedom as possible analogies some have used to show the plausibility of (3). It may turn out that those models don’t do the argumentative work I thought they might do (or others thought they could do). Nonetheless, the failure of any of those models would not entail that (3) is false.
Re: “Obviously, God’s will to create cannot be the same as his will to not create, so the reason cannot be his will; his desire to actualize world A cannot be the same as his desire to actualize world B, so it cannot be the matter of his desires; and so on and so forth. Either the choice is internal (so God is not identical in those two worlds) or it is not his choice at all.”
This analysis is close to what Steven Nemes takes up in his modal collapse article (see here). It absolutely sounds plausible. But, there is room for the classical theist to deny some of the implicit assumptions. I’ll add three points in that vein:
1) It may be that every event has an explanation, but not every event has a contrastive explanation. Tomaszewski mentions this toward the end of our episode. In other words, there are more modest versions of a PSR that do not require world A and world B to have been brought about by a difference intrinsic to God. Steven Nemes makes the point in a similar way by saying that classical theists should deny that the “difference principle” applies to God’s causality. That principle states: a difference in an effect presupposes a difference in the cause. If one thinks this principle is universally true, then arguments like yours will go through. But, if this principle is false, then the argument does not go through. Nemes explains more in the podcast episode and article linked there.
2) Re: “Either the choice is internal (so God is not identical in those two worlds) or it is not his choice at all.” Here, a classical theist could deny that the “choice” you speak of is just like that of a human agent. We need not interpret “God’s choice to actualize world A” in the same way that we interpret “Bob’s choice to eat chocolate ice cream.” In other words, we may speak of God’s choice being like human choice analogously, but it’s also very different and transcends our finite understanding. So, suppose on classical theism, God brings about world A. We can refer to “God’s choice to bring about world A” but admit this is not a literal mental event that takes inside of God. Rather, that God’s choosing to actualize A is our way of referring to the facts: (i) in virtue of his power, God brought about A and (ii) in virtue of his power, God could have brought about a myriad of other things.
3) If your argument about God’s choice/desires poses a problem for classical theism, it also poses a problem for non-classical theists. Tomaszewski explains (and a 1999 paper by Timothy O’Connor in Faith and Philosophy makes a similar point) that we must ask: From where does God’s intention to actualize A arise? Is this intention contingent or necessary? If it is necessary, then modal collapse is not avoided. If it is contingent and arises from God’s necessary divine essence, then we have the same alleged problem pushed back a step i.e. the contingent intention to actualize A arises from God’s necessary essence. But how can God’s necessary essence produce this contingent intention as opposed to a different one? And if his necessary essence can produce distinct contingent intentions (while remaining unchanged i.e. his necessary essence is unchanged), then there seems to be no problem in principle with a necessary being producing distinct effects (while remaining unchanged).
I hope these points get you up-to-speed on an ongoing discussion of the modal collapse objection. You’ll want to keep an eye out for more literature on the subject this year and next.
The issue whether one cause can bring different results is different from the problem of control. The cause might bring different results without control over them (like in the radioactive fission).
If the two worlds A and B differ only by the effect of the same cause, the question we must ask is: is there a reason why the actual world is A and not an equally possible world B? I would think that if the answer is ‘yes’, then such reason must exist only in world A and not world B. Otherwise, if the world B was actual, it would have a reason why the actual world is A and not B, which does not seem coherent.
Thanks, Jabberwock, for your important comments on this topic and good questions. A brief response.
Re: “If the two worlds A and B differ only by the effect of the same cause, the question we must ask is: is there a reason why the actual world is A and not an equally possible world B?”
As a classical theist, as I see it, the reason why the actual world is world A is that God in virtue of his power brought about world A.
Re: “I would think that if the answer is ‘yes’, then such reason must exist only in world A and not world B. Otherwise, if the world B was actual, it would have a reason why the actual world is A and not B, which does not seem coherent.”
I think the reason I gave above (i.e. that God in virtue of his power brought about world A) only exists in world A and so satisfies your requirement. But I sense that I’m not fully grasping the dilemma you’re pushing. Perhaps you’re saying God’s reasons would need to precede God’s actions in a way similar to how a human agent deliberates before making a choice. If that’s the case, then I would deny the set up of the model that God needs to deliberate or that he needs to act for reasons in the way human agents do (though we could speak about these things of God metaphorically and analogously depending on the specifics).
Also, if you want to see Nemes and Tomaszewski explain some of their most recent thoughts on modal collapse arguments, they do so here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VRE5xeIxsIM&t=2788s
If you accept that there is a reason, different for each possible world, then the initial setup cannot be true – the worlds A and B CANNOT differ only by the effect A or effect B. In each of them there must exist also the ‘world-bringing power’. If Tomaszewski’s explanation assumes that the possible worlds differ only by the effect, then he cannot postulate God in control of them. And vice versa: If God is in control, i.e. there is a reason, then the world cannot differ only by the creation effects.
But then follows the question: is that power intrinsic to God or extrinsic? If it is intrinsic, then there is a difference about God in those two worlds. If it is extrinsic – assuming we accept such reification of God’s power – then it is just another world-differing effect, a part of the contingent world outside of God. Thus we can ask exactly the same question: is there a reason why in world A there is a God-external A-world-bringing power? If not, then the world-bringing powers, extrinsic to God, are out of his control. If there is a reason, we ask whether it is intrinsic to God or extrinsic etc. No matter how many steps we take, it ends up the same.
Thus it seems the dilemma still stands: either there is something different about God that brings about world A and not B or God has no control of it.
Thanks for the reply, Jabberwock, and good points. I suppose I’ll first ask for clarification of this:
Re: “If you accept that there is a reason, different for each possible world…”
I don’t think I accepted that, but I’m also curious about what you mean by it. Are you thinking of a reason as some sort of argument/thought pattern that must preexist in the divine intellect? Also, I should not presume to speak on behalf of Tomaszewski, so just take what I’m saying as what I’m saying and Tomaszewski’s statements in his paper and the podcast can be what he is saying. He has studied this more deeply than I and may be able to bring out greater nuance, so I don’t want to give a false impression as to his answer.
Re: “If Tomaszewski’s explanation assumes that the possible worlds differ only by the effect, then he cannot postulate God in control of them.”
I’m not seeing how this follows. It seems to me that the possible worlds could differ as different effects of God’s causality and that God is in control of the effect. I don’t think God’s being in control of the effect requires God having real distinctions in his being prior to bringing about the effect.
Re: “Thus it seems the dilemma still stands: either there is something different about God that brings about world A and not B or God has no control of it.”
I fail to see how the dilemma stands since I don’t see why there needs to be a difference in God in order for him to be in control of his effects. Why can’t there be no change in God, distinct effects, and God in control of those effects? Perhaps there’s a key piece I’m missing. Also, I’m curious what you think about the 3rd point I made where the problem applies to non-classical theists as well.
Thanks again for the informed engagement. I think you’ll be interested to follow the conversation in the literature as it progresses.
Peace,
John
Well, you wrote:
‘As a classical theist, as I see it, the reason why the actual world is world A is that God in virtue of his power brought about world A.’
If the world was B, would you say that the reason the actual world is world B is that God in virtue of his power brought about world A? I do not think so, so the reason must be different.
And I I actually do not have anything in mind when I am asking this: it is your postulated view. All I am asking whether there is _anything_ that makes the world A and not B. Note that this ‘something’ cannot be the result itself: if that was the case, we would be saying ‘the world A is world A and not B because it is world A and not B’. That means that the fact that the actual world is A and not B is a brute fact. Thus, if we want to posit that God had any control of the fact whether the world is A and not B the difference between the worlds cannot be ONLY in the effect.
Maybe a simple example will help: suppose that the world A and B differ by the fact that in the world B there is one star more, so it A is an odd-star world and B is an even-star world. If the worlds differed ONLY by the number of stars, then there would be no reason why we live in an odd-star world. Sure, we can say that the world is the result of God saying ‘Let there be stars’, but then he did not get to control the number. If he said ‘Let there be an odd number of stars’, then it would be an additional fact (beside the actual number of stars) that the worlds differed by – obviously he would not be saying that in an even-star world!
Of course, I am not saying that God has to ‘say’ something literally. Still, whatever and however he decides, the deciding itself cannot be the same in both worlds – any decision on a _specific_ creation must be different than the effect of that decision. There must be something differing logically preceding the decided effect. If the worlds differ only by the effect, i.e. the number of stars, then there was no deciding, choosing, willing, etc. That is, there is no reason, no anything that makes the world as it is.
Thanks, Jabberwock, for this valuable engagement. Here are a few further replies:
Re: “If the world was B, would you say that the reason the actual world is world B is that God in virtue of his power brought about world A?”
No, I wouldn’t say that because that would not be true. If the actual world is B, then God in virtue of his power brought about world B.
Re: “I do not think so, so the reason must be different.”
I’m still unclear on what you mean by “the reason” here so I don’t see how this follows, but perhaps my further comments will help.
Re: I am asking whether there is _anything_ that makes the world A and not B.
Yes. Because God in virtue of his power made the world A, the world is A and no B.
Re: if that was the case, we would be saying ‘the world A is world A and not B because it is world A and not B’.
That’s not my claim since it leaves out God’s role in creation. It would be more accurate to say: the world A is world A and not world B because world A was created by God’s power and not world B.
Re: That means that the fact that the actual world is A and not B is a brute fact. Thus, if we want to posit that God had any control of the fact whether the world is A and not B the difference between the worlds cannot be ONLY in the effect.
If the ‘effects’ were somehow detachable things not related to God’s causality in any way, then perhaps this would follow. But that’s not how I view the effects, so I don’t agree that this follows.
Re: Still, whatever and however he decides, the deciding itself cannot be the same in both worlds – any decision on a _specific_ creation must be different than the effect of that decision. There must be something differing logically preceding the decided effect.
I think this looks at God’s causing and decision-making too anthropomorphically and on-par with a human agent. As a classical theist, I deny that God’s causality is limited by conditions that apply to creaturely causality. Also, this reasoning seems to presuppose the difference principle (i.e. a difference in the effect presupposes a difference in the cause) which I (and Nemes explicitly) deny applies to God. So, I do not accept your claims here.
Re: There must be something differing logically preceding the decided effect.
This, too, seems to presuppose the difference principle which the classical theist can deny applies to God.
Re: If the worlds differ only by the effect, i.e. the number of stars, then there was no deciding, choosing, willing, etc. That is, there is no reason, no anything that makes the world as it is.
God’s making the world the way it is (e.g. with even number of stars) would provide sufficient explanation for the world being the way it is.
Perhaps these further replies will help you see how I’m thinking about this. Also, feel free to re-formulate a modal collapse argument in numbered premises. Sometimes, that makes it easier to point out specific disagreements.
Peace,
John
As I have clearly stated, I do not presuppose the difference principle, i.e. the cause must be different for the effects to be different. I am saying that for the cause to control the effect the cause must be different.
However, as I may be misunderstanding your position, just two questions to clarify it.
1. Do you believe God’s making the world with the even number of stars is different than the stars themselves?
2. Do you believe God’s making the world with the even number of stars exists in a world with the odd number of stars?
Good questions; I hope my answers provide some clarification.
Re: “1. Do you believe God’s making the world with the even number of stars is different than the stars themselves?”
Yes, but there may only be a verbal difference. ‘God’s making the world with the even number of stars’ refers to both the causal and effectual sense of God’s action whereas ‘the stars themselves’ refers solely to the effects.
Re: “2. Do you believe God’s making the world with the even number of stars exists in a world with the odd number of stars?”
No. Since I take ‘God’s making the world with the even number of stars’ to refer both to the causal and effectual sense of God’s action. But, I would affirm that power by which God could make a world with an even number of stars exists in the world with the odd number of stars (since the power in virtue of which God could create that is Himself and he’s unchanging across all possible worlds).
Hopefully, this helps clarify. As I said previously, feel free to present a modal collapse argument in specific numbered premises that you think is successful. When faced with the specific argument, I can help identify which premises or inferences the classical theist would deny.
Peace,
John
OK, here is the premised form:
1. Two possible worlds differ only by the effect A (world A) and the effect B (world B).
2. If God is in control, then in world A God chooses world A over world B.
3. God’s choosing world A over world B is different than effect A.
4. In a possible world B there is no God’s choosing world A over world B.
5. In a possible world A there is no God’s choosing world A over world B.
6. God is not in control.
Thanks, Jabberwock, for this! I appreciate you taking the time to lay this out. So, as a classical theist, I’m inclined to reject (5). However, there may be ambiguities in the set-up that lead me to reject a different premise. Here’s what I mean:
Re: “5. In a possible world A there is no God’s choosing world A over world B.”
I would say there God’s “choosing” obtains in that world, but his “choosing” is not on par with regular old choices that we make. I’d interpret God’s “choosing” as God, in virtue of his power, bringing about world A when God could have, in virtue of his power, brought about world B. In this sense, God “chooses” world A over world B in world A.
Hope this helps clarify my position! Since you have such valuable remarks on this, can I ask if you are a philosophy student? Undergraduate, graduate, or beyond? I’d encourage you to keep an eye on the literature forthcoming and perhaps even enter the dialogue with a paper of your own.
Peace,
John
Well, 5. follows logically from the other premises: if the worlds differ ONLY by the effect A/B, God’s choosing world A over world B is different than the effect itself and in a possible world B there is no God choosing world A over world B, then it follows logically that in world A there is no God choosing world A over world B (because the effect A/B is the ONLY difference between the worlds, as assumed in premise 1.). If you postulate that in world A, beside the effect A, there is also God’s choosing world A over world B (which is not in world B), then there is more than one difference between the worlds – it means you should rather reject the premise 1 (which is fine, it just leads to a different argument – the one for modal collapse). So if you reject premise 1., I can follow up with another argument.
And no, I am not a philosophy student, I just became interested in the arguments for the modal collapse on classical theism.
Hmmm, you may be right, but I’m not sure.
Re: “If you postulate that in world A, beside the effect A, there is also God’s choosing world A over world B (which is not in world B), then there is more than one difference between the worlds – it means you should rather reject the premise 1”
I’m not sure that I need to posit “more than one difference.” My resolution is to identify ‘God’s choosing world A over world B’ with ‘God, in virtue of his power, bringing about world A when, in virtue of his power, he could have brought about world B’. But if premise (1) means that when discussing the “effect itself” one can’t refer to God, then I think you’re right that I would deny premise (1). And in that case, I’d be interested to see your other version.
Peace,
John
First let me explain why the first premise needs to be rejected for God to be in control. The first premise means that there is only one difference between the worlds: for example, the number of stars. So:
world A = world B minus one star
from premise 4.:
world B = (world where God is NOT choosing world A over world B)
but then from premises 1. and 4.:
world A = (world where God is not choosing world A over world B) minus one star
If you accept the premise 4. and postulate that in world A there is God choosing world A over world B, you must deny premise 1.
If you do that, I put forward the following argument (I misspoke – it is not for modal collapse, but against thomistic assumptions):
1. Two possible worlds differ by the effect A (world A) and the effect B (world B).
2. If God is in control, they also differ by the fact that in world A there is God’s choosing world A over B and in world B there is no God’s choosing world A over B.
3. God’s choosing world A over world B is intrinsic to God.
4. There is a difference between two possible worlds that is intrinsic to God.
5. Therefore, God is different between two possible worlds.
6. Therefore, thomism is false.
1. is our initial premise, 2. follows from the rejection of my previous argument, 4 and the rest follows from the previous ones.
Thus the objections must focus on the premise 3. However, I think it might be rather difficult to argue that ‘God’s choosing’ might be extrinsic to God. I am not sure that is even coherent: how could ‘choosing’ (different than the effect itself) exists outside of God? It would appear that even God’s choosing to not create would result in existence of something outside of him. This seems like a reification of God’s doing.
Thanks, Jabberwock, for your patient clarifications and explanation. I think I follow you and agree that I would object to premise (3) in the new argument.
Re: “However, I think it might be rather difficult to argue that ‘God’s choosing’ might be extrinsic to God. I am not sure that is even coherent: how could ‘choosing’ (different than the effect itself) exists outside of God? It would appear that even God’s choosing to not create would result in existence of something outside of him. This seems like a reification of God’s doing.”
I wouldn’t say God’s “choosing” is entirely extrinsic, but I would definitely say that “choosing” is different for God than it is for us. My account of “God’s choosing” (perhaps I haven’t been sufficiently clear on this) is as follows:
“God’s choosing A over B” means ‘God, in virtue of his power, brings about A when God, in virtue of his power, could have brought about B.’ In the causal sense, God’s “choosing” refers to the power by which he brings about the effect (which is himself). In the effectual sense, God’s “choosing” refers to the specific effect that is brought about by his power (instead of some other effect).
In other words, my account of “God’s choosing” is basically the same as Nemes’ account of “God’s action.” The only difference is when we predicate “choosing” of God this also concerns the fact that in virtue of his power he could have brought about different effects than the ones he brought about (when we speak of God’s action, we don’t raise that factor).
Now, one can say this account of “choosing” is not familiar to us and doesn’t seem like “choosing.” Perhaps that’s right. As a classical theist, I’d say the “choosing” is at best analogous to human choosing, but also that God’s ways transcend our own.
You make good points, Jabberwock, and are helping me to think through my accounts of these things. How about I give you the last word and we revisit this conversation after some time? I think it has run its course, and that will give me a chance to revisit the modal collapse literature more and get back to you again.
Peace,
John
Sure, we can wrap it up, as I believe we just come to a point of our disagreement. It was very nice to discuss this with you and it did help me flesh my arguments more.
I would only point out that the Nemes’ account is somewhat lacking in this respect, as we do seem to agree that in the world B there is no ‘God’s choosing world A over world B’ which there is in world A. So, as long as we agree that this ‘choosing’ (whatever that is, I really do not want to impose any preconceptions on that) is not the effect itself (because one star is not ‘choosing’), then it must be about God. But as I wrote, we can just leave it here, understanding where we differ.
Thank you very much for the discussion!
Hi Jabberwock,
I just wanted to draw your attention to the recent episode with Steven Nemes where we address your worry head-on. http://www.classicaltheism.com/nemes2
Peace,
John
@rapheal just because propositions undergo change, doesn’t necessitate god in his sublime essence undergoes change, we don’t adhere to propositional knowledge for god, so if the truth value of a proposition alters, it doesn’t render god’s essence mutable, since we don’t affirm propositional knowledge for god.