Ep. #92 – Simplicity Does Not Entail Modal Collapse
Summary
Does the doctrine of divine simplicity entail modal collapse? How can the classical theists respond to such modal collapse objections? Why is the original problem an objection for virtually all theists and not just classical theists? Steven Nemes, a doctoral student, joins us to answer these questions and discuss a very interesting paper of his.
Guest Bio
Steven Nemes is a PhD candidate in systematic theology at Fuller Theological Seminary and adjunct professor of philosophy at Grand Canyon University. He’s also the author of a recent paper: Divine Simplicity Does Not Entail Modal Collapse, which is the subject of today’s episode.
Resources Mentioned
Divine Simplicity Does Not Entail Modal Collapse by Steven Nemes
Why Everyone Must Deny the Difference Principle (Short Blog Post) by Steven Nemes
Simplicity and Creation by Timothy O’Connor
Collapsing the Modal Collapse Argument by Christopher Tomaszewski
A Plethora of Prima Facie Problems for Classical Theism by Joe Schmid (and his further response can be read here)
A Response to the Plethora of Problems by 6 Classical Theists
Related Episodes
Ep. #66 – Simplicity & Modal Collapse w/ Christopher Tomaszewski
Ep. #65 – Simplicity & the Trinity w/ Paul Chutikorn
BONUS|Aquinas and the Metaphysics of Creation w/ Dr. Kerr
Ep. #64 – Absolute Divine Simplicity w/ Dr. Dolezal
I have somehow missed this…
Unfortunately, Nemes does not understand fully Moreland and Craig’s objection… If, as he writes, ‘It may be true that there
would be no answer to the question of why this world was created rather than another one’, then God has no control over which of the possible worlds is created. Saying that God chose this world over another possible world would BE the answer, so if there is no answer, then God did not choose it. Creation of this particular world and not another would be completely random.
This assumes the only way for there to be control over which world is created is for God to have a different reason for creating one world than another. But that begs the question against the Thomistic classical theist that holds God’s Reason for creating (love of Himself) is held constant and could terminate in a myriad of options that God could bring about. This topic appears again in the episode that came out just today: http://www.classicaltheism.com/intentionalaction — For the Thomistic classical theist, the “choosing” is extrinsic to God and it’s done on purpose. “Choosing an effect” just is identified with the effect being brought about on purpose when other effects could have been brought about.
That would mean that God just chooses from possible worlds for no reason, i.e. randomly. Is our existence a matter of luck? How can our life have meaning, if there is absolutely no reason for our existence?
Suppose that I use a computer program that generates poetry from random words. Sure, you can say that I am ‘in control’, as I am the one running the program, but am I in control of what is on a particular page?
So, I disagree that “God just chooses from possible worlds for no reason i.e. randomly.” Rather, through his one Reason (i.e. love of Himself and the manifestation of divine goodness) he chooses a particular world that manifests the divine goodness in some finite way (or chooses a multiverse of worlds, each of which manifests the divine goodness in a finite way). We take on the idea that God just acts randomly or without reason toward the end of two recent episodes:
http://www.classicaltheism.com/officehours3 — See the quote Pat Flynn reads from Ives Simon
http://www.classicaltheism.com/intentionalaction — See Gaven Kerr’s explanation of God acting for reasons toward the end of the episode
These are good questions that I’m still investigating.
Re: “You posit that God has a reason for acting, but not for choosing one world over another.”
Yes, God has a “reason for acting” in the sense that He acts through “love of Himself to manifest divine goodness.” But, I would say this is only analogous to a “reason for acting” in the sense in which created beings have and act upon reasons for acting. For creatures, the reasons can (i) impact, incline, or otherwise affect us to act in one way over another and (ii) make our choice more fully intelligible. For God, his one “reason for acting” does not (i) causally affect his particular choice (as it’s consistent with a number of particular choices), but (ii) it does make his choice more fully intelligible.
In a secondary sense, the “reason for choosing one world over another” may be cashed out in terms of “the unique manifestation of divine goodness that obtains in this world.”
Re: “Moreover, you posit that there is nothing about God’s act that decides that the world A is actual and not world B (so there is no act of choosing).”
This hinges on the ambiguity in “God’s act.” There is nothing about “God’s act” in the causal sense (i.e. “God’s act” = the divine nature) which necessitates or prompts or inclines God to make a particular world. But it doesn’t follow from that that there is no act of choosing. On classical theism, “God’s act of choosing” is in the very activity of causing the effect (the action of the agent is in the patient).
Re: “That means that there is no reason/cause/explanation for why world A and not world B.”
I’m not sure I agree, but I’m still forming my thoughts on this. The cause/explanation of world A is the divine nature + extrinsic activity of bringing world A about. This “total activity” (i.e. divine nature + extrinsic effects) is different in world A than world B. In that sense, the cause/explanation of world A is different than it would have been had God made world B.
Secondly, as far as a reason for world A and not world B, I’m inclined to locate this “reason” in the unique manifestation of divine goodness in world A. Now, such a reason does not compel, incline, coerce, or prompt God to make world A, but it provides for a fuller intelligible explanation of why we have world A: God chose (i.e. acted extrinsically on purpose) to manifest the divine goodness in the ways found in world A.
Some of these remarks are tentative, and I intend to write more on the subject in the future. Fr. Brian Davies writes that we should not think of the God of classical theism as acting for reasons as people do. I agree with him. So, any “acting for reasons” stuff going on in our analysis is going to be at most analogical. I think Dr. W. Matthews Grant provides a good way forward, and Anscombe’s analysis of intentional action is also interesting.
And I thank you, Jabberwock, for the insightful questions that continue to prompt my investigation into these topics.
There seems to be a contradiction in your descriptions. You write:
On classical theism, “God’s act of choosing” is in the very activity of causing the effect (the action of the agent is in the patient).
This seems to suggest that ‘activity’ is the cause of the effect, not the effect itself. Obviously, the effect cannot be the activity that causes it!
But then you write:
The cause/explanation of world A is the divine nature + extrinsic activity of bringing world A about. This “total activity” (i.e. divine nature + extrinsic effects)
But in this description there is no separate ‘extrinsic activity’ that brings about the extrinsic effect. If ‘total activity’ is divine nature + extrinsic effects, then your ‘activity of causing the effect’ from the first sentence MUST lie within God, as there is nothing else (assuming the effect does not cause itself).
Even if you posit ‘extrinsic activity’ which is neither God nor the creation itself, it entails further problems. What would that activity actually be? How ‘activity’ can have an ontological status by itself? That seems contrary to how we ordinarily consider activities – these are states of the agent himself, not entities that take on existence outside of him. I am not identical to my running, but the activity itself is description of what my body goes through, so in that sense I AM running. My running does not appear beside me when I do that (i.e. it does not have a separate ontological status beside the states of my body).
Moreover, it just bumps the problem a step, but does not solve it at all. If on that view the difference between the worlds is:
A. God + activity A + effect A
B. God + activity B + effect B
we can ask the very same question: is there a reason why in world A there is the activity A and not activity B? And the answer is equally problematic…
Thanks for these follow-up comments. Here are a few thoughts.
Re: “This seems to suggest that ‘activity’ is the cause of the effect, not the effect itself. Obviously, the effect cannot be the activity that causes it!”
There is ambiguity in the phrasing, yes. Let me try to clarify. God’s activity can be taken 2 ways.
(1) God’s activity (in the causal sense) = God (i.e. the divine nature)
(2) God’s activity (in the effectual sense) = extrinsic effects brought about by God with a relation of dependence on God. This is what W. Matthews Grant refers to as “God’s causal acts” i.e. the effects brought about by God with dependence on him. See his interview here with Pat Flynn and Jim Madden for more on that model. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jhc5dZLHqFo&t=2558s
(3) God’s “total activity” = God + extrinsic effects with their dependence on God
Re: “But in this description there is no separate ‘extrinsic activity’ that brings about the extrinsic effect. If ‘total activity’ is divine nature + extrinsic effects, then your ‘activity of causing the effect’ from the first sentence MUST lie within God, as there is nothing else (assuming the effect does not cause itself).”
The idea is that the “extrinsic activity” is a way of referring to extrinsic effects with an eye on the fact that they are also dependent on God for their existence at every moment they exist.
One other term I should get more clear about.
Let E = extrinsic effect.
(3) God’s act of choosing E = E’s existence with a dependence relation on God where E is brought about on purpose (i.e. not by accident or happenstance or luck). God’s “act of choosing” is most similar to (2) above though it adds the idea that the act is done on purpose.
So, that’s how I understand the terms, and I don’t really see it as leading to a problem as you are suggesting. Of course, there may be a deeper difference between us in that you may not think an absolutely immutable God can act at all. But if an immutable God can act, then his action will be extrinsic to himself (since otherwise, he’d be changing), and I don’t see a problem with this immutable God being able to bring on purpose a world of his choosing. As to whether this is done “for a reason”–see my previous comment for musings. If the concern is just that eventually, the classical theist cannot give a “contrastive explanation” but only a “sufficient non-contrastive explanation” for some world, I think non-classical theist views are in the same boat (as Tomaszewski explains in another recent episode: http://www.classicaltheism.com/hilary ).
Also, in your reply, I’d appreciate it if you could pinpoint again precisely the problem you see with this account. I fear we may talk past each other with all of the differences in terminology and language ambiguities. I also think this conversation has largely run its course, so I’m happy to give you the last word on this. In the future, when I write up a blog article about these distinctions, we can discuss them again. Thanks for your engagement.
Concerning the two types of ‘activities’ – note that the cause/reason why A and not B must exist only in world A. Thus it rules out the activity (1), as it is exactly the same in both world. But that leaves only the activity (2), which is the effect itself. That is, on your view, the reason why A exists and not B, is only because A exists and not B. Or, to put it in causal terms, the cause for this particular effect is the effect itself. Don’t you see a problem with that?
If it helps putting it in different terms, let us consider the particular creation to be an outcome. We can ask: what does the particular outcome depend on? What must be different about the world A, that we reach the outcome A and not B? On your view it seems to be: only the outcome itself. But what if the outcome did not depend on anything? We would have the exact same situation: the world A would differ from the world B only in that the outcome would be A. This is simply because saying ‘X depends on X’ is equivalent to saying ‘X depends on nothing’, as a thing cannot be in a dependence relation with itself. But that means that the outcome A does not depend on anything at all. If the outcome does not depend on anything, how God is in control?
I’m not sure we’re making any progress here, and I accept partial blame for that since I’m sure my use of terminology has developed as I read more of W. Matthews Grant (i.e. the way I’ve phrased things months ago might be different now). But, alas, you have sucked me into more replies:
Re: “But that leaves only the activity (2), which is the effect itself.”
No, “God’s activity” in the sense of (2) is not merely the effect itself. As I defined in the previous comment, it is the effect brought about with a relation of dependence on God.
Re: “That is, on your view, the reason why A exists and not B, is only because A exists and not B.”
That’s close but not right. The reason why A exists and not B is because God brought about A (with A’s dependence relation on God) and God did not bring about B.
Re: “Or, to put it in causal terms, the cause for this particular effect is the effect itself. Don’t you see a problem with that?”
Yes, I see a problem with that, but it is not my view.
Re: “We can ask: what does the particular outcome depend on? What must be different about the world A, that we reach the outcome A and not B?”
As I see it, a difference in this scenario is simply that world A was made by God with a dependence relation on God, and B was not made by God.
Re: No, “God’s activity” in the sense of (2) is not merely the effect itself. As I defined in the previous comment, it is the effect brought about with a relation of dependence on God.
Relation of dependence of creation on God is exactly the same in both world A and world B, so it is not the thing that is different about the worlds. So my point still stands: the only difference between the worlds are the effects. As the thing that explains why world A obtains and not world B MUST be a thing that exists only in world A, and the ONLY thing that is different between the worlds are the effects, then it entails what I wrote in the previous post.
Re: That’s close but not right. The reason why A exists and not B is because God brought about A (with A’s dependence relation on God) and God did not bring about B.
But what is exactly God’s ‘bringing about’? There are three options: ‘bringing about’ is intrinsic to God, ‘bringing about’ is intrinsic to the effects and ‘bringing about’ is extrinsic to both. Which is it?
Re: As I see it, a difference in this scenario is simply that world A was made by God with a dependence relation on God, and B was not made by God.
Is ‘God made world A and not B because God made world A and not B’ really an explanation/reason?
P.S. Naturally, we can end this exchange whenever you prefer, I will not mind.
Re: “Relation of dependence of creation on God is exactly the same in both world A and world B, so it is not the thing that is different about the worlds.”
Hmm, maybe. But it could also be that the nature of the relation of dependence is tailored to the world. That there is a relation of dependence on God is “exactly the same.” But, possibly, world A’s relation of dependence on God could perhaps differ from world B’s relation of dependence on God.
Re: “As the thing that explains why world A obtains and not world B MUST be a thing that exists only in world A…”
This did not immediately occur to me previously, but I think this could be the heart of our disagreement. Consider this exampple:
(1) A libertarian agent that is entitatively the same in the run-up to a decision may freely choose A or B, but prior to the choice of A or B, there is no difference in the world that explains why A and not B (assuming he could’ve freely chosen B).
So, I don’t see that the principle undergirding your objection is necessarily true.
Re: “But what is exactly God’s ‘bringing about’? There are three options: ‘bringing about’ is intrinsic to God, ‘bringing about’ is intrinsic to the effects and ‘bringing about’ is extrinsic to both. Which is it?”
“God’s bringing about” is a label for the “total activity” I defined earlier.
Re: “Is ‘God made world A and not B because God made world A and not B’ really an explanation/reason?”
Close, but not quite what I’m saying. Rather, the existence of world A and the non-existence of world B (if such a thing can be known–idk that we could know world B wasn’t made) is explained by God’s making world A and not making world B.
Re: “P.S. Naturally, we can end this exchange whenever you prefer, I will not mind.”
I generally don’t mind continuing when it’s productive, but I just sensed we were going in circles without getting to any root disagreements. Perhaps another couple of comments and this will have run its course.
Re: But, possibly, world A’s relation of dependence on God could perhaps differ from world B’s relation of dependence on God.
That would leave us with the question: why the relations are different?
Re: This did not immediately occur to me previously, but I think this could be the heart of our disagreement. Consider this exampple:
That might indeed be the main point of our disagreement. I would say it follows logically – can a reason why B does NOT exist occur in a world where it actually DOES exist? Does ‘choosing to create’ exist in a world without creation? Note that in case of truly random effects, where the cause is exactly the same, there is no such reason/explanation – we cannot explain why in our world the truly random generator gave us 5 and not 2, because there is no such explanation in principle.
Also, I am not sure your example works in your favor. If the libertarian agent is human, then the decision precedes the effect causally and often temporally. I can plan to do A next week, so the reason for doing A exists long time before the effect. It can also be that my decision never comes to fruition. Thus the explanation (decision) is distinctly different from the effect itself. The very reason we can tell that the agent is in control of the process is because the decision takes place IN the mind of the agent. There is no way we can consciously choose something without our minds being different about it. So, in case of a human libertarian agent, there is definitely something different than the effect A that explains that effect and exists ONLY in world A. My decision to do A (explanation) does not exist in a world where I do B (effect) instead.
I will leave the other points aside now, as they might likely bring us to the above issue.
Re: “That might indeed be the main point of our disagreement. I would say it follows logically – can a reason why B does NOT exist occur in a world where it actually DOES exist?”
There doesn’t need to be a separate reason why B does not exist. One theory of classical theism is that God exists alone in a perfectly simple act of understanding himself completely. Embedded within that one act are all the reasons he would ever have for making any kind of world (including “reasons” for both A and B). Then, God brings about world A.
Re: “Does ‘choosing to create’ exist in a world without creation?”
No.
Re: “Also, I am not sure your example works in your favor. If the libertarian agent is human, then the decision precedes the effect causally and often temporally. I can plan to do A next week, so the reason for doing A exists long time before the effect. It can also be that my decision never comes to fruition. Thus the explanation (decision) is distinctly different from the effect itself.”
Yes, but then just run the analogy in terms of the “decision.” If you allow that at some moment a libertarian free agent can choose A or B, then I don’t see how you can disallow that for God. Also, for a perfect being, the “process” can all just collapse down to the decision — God’s “deciding to act” is his “choosing to act” which is his “the effects brought about with a dependence relation on God when different effects could have been brought about.”
Re: “The very reason we can tell that the agent is in control of the process is because the decision takes place IN the mind of the agent.”
This changes the subject to epistemology (“The very reason we can tell…”). The disagreement is not about how we can tell, but rather about what is possible. To assume that God has to act just like creatures do in order to be in control of the process is to commit a fallacy of accident, which is explained in this episode at 24 minutes and 50 seconds.
Re: “There is no way we can consciously choose something without our minds being different about it. So, in case of a human libertarian agent, there is definitely something different than the effect A that explains that effect and exists ONLY in world A.”
Hmm, it sounds like you may deny that a free libertarian agent can actually choose A or B with the run-up to the choice not determining them to one or the other? If so, then that is the heart of our disagreement. In other words, it seems your view disallows radical libertarian freedom even for God, but I would allow God to have radical libertarian freedom. Alexander Pruss describes such a view of libertarian freedom in this article on divine simplicity.
Re: “My decision to do A (explanation) does not exist in a world where I do B (effect) instead.”
I agree with this.
Re: There doesn’t need to be a separate reason why B does not exist.
My assumption is that if God is in control, then in world A God chose A over B and in world B God chose B over A. That is the ‘reason’.
Re: “Does ‘choosing to create’ exist in a world without creation?” No.
That is simply incompatible with the free will account by Pruss you have presented below. If choosing is the pre-divergence state, as per Pruss account, then ‘choosing to create’ (i.e. the moment of deciding) is exactly the same as ‘choosing to not create’, so they must exist in both worlds, which you have just denied.
Re: Also, for a perfect being, the “process” can all just collapse down to the decision — God’s “deciding to act” is his “choosing to act”
But that is exactly the problem: if ‘choosing to create’ exists in one world and not the other (as you say), then the decision must be extrinsic to God, i.e. must be the same as the effect. But we are saying the decision is the cause for the effect! It would be even more bizarre in case of non-creation, as the ‘decision’ that is extrinsic to God, i.e. ‘effect’ is literally nothing. In a world in which God does not create there is nothing extrinsic to him, so how can a ‘decision’ be extrinsic?
Re: “My decision to do A (explanation) does not exist in a world where I do B (effect) instead.” I agree with this.
If you then agree that God’s decision to do A does not exist in a world where he does B, then the decision itself must be extrinsic to God. That makes the decision (cause) identical to result (effect), which you have previously denied.
Let us consider the water quenching example:
I want to quench my thirst – I can use the tap or the bottle. I drink from the tap. Someone asks ‘Why did you drink from the tap?’ ‘I wanted to quench my thirst’. That is the reason for drinking, I agree, but for nothing more. When someone then asks ‘I see, but why from the tap and NOT from the bottle?’ I would not answer: ‘I wanted to quench my thirst’, would I? That is no explanation at all.
You posit that God has a reason for acting, but not for choosing one world over another. Moreover, you posit that there is nothing about God’s act that decides that the world A is actual and not world B (so there is no act of choosing). That means that there is no reason/cause/explanation for why world A and not world B.