No Brute Facts

“I don’t want any bruteness in my worldview…Edward Feser has made a convincing case that there can be no such thing as just “some bruteness” in one’s world view; bruteness is the camel that once his nose is under the tent, he’s coming in. In the sense that we are talking about the most fundamental level of explanation of contingent things in the world, to allow bruteness in at the most fundamental level…would result in all the downstream explanations being contaminated with that bruteness.”

Dr. Christopher Tomaszewski, Classical Theism Podcast, episode #171

The above quote highlights why the doctrine of divine simplicity is of such great concern for classical theists: the classical theist does not want to hit the bottom of explanations for why things exist and be left with some unexplainable, fundamental things that exist as brute facts (i.e. that their existence is intrinsically incapable of being fully intelligible).

A recent paper by Enric Gel argues that classical theism offers the best explanation for why there must be one and only one, purely actual first cause of all existence (pure act theism). Gel argues that any other explanation that doesn’t posit a singular, undivided source of being must result in some brute facts. Let’s explore why.

Act and Potency

First, a little background: the ancient Greeks came up with the distinction between being-in-act and being-in-potency to answer the Parmendidean challenge as to how change is possible in the world.^[1]Gel, Enric. How Many and Why? A Question for Graham Oppy that Classical Theism Can Answer. Religious Studies (2021), p. 1  Being-in-act, is how being exists in reality at any given moment (the hot cup of coffee on the desk in front of me is actually hot). Potential being is any way a being could possibly be actualized (the hot cup of coffee could become cold if it sits long enough, or if ice is added to the cup).

Being-in-potency sets the limitations for what a thing can do (e.g. a puppy cannot fly like a bird or turn into a tree but it can grow into a dog). Being-in-potency also accounts for how things can change at all; change is simply the process of a thing’s potencies being actualized – possibility becomes reality via causation. Every contingent thing that exists is a mixture of being in act and potency.^[2]ibid. p. 1 And finallly, a purely actual reality (as is claimed with pure act theism) refers to a being-in-act with no potencies standing in need of actualization (no part of its being needs to be switched from “off” to “on”).

Gel’s Argument with Causal Finitism

Gel puts forth two ways of arguing for pure act theism. The first is an argument including causal finitism. Here, Gel argues that nothing contingent can have an infinite causal history; it must have an initial cause that first reduces its potentiality to actuality. Causal finitism claims there must be some necessary initial cause to all of reality that allows for any contingent causal chain to begin. Alexander Pruss and Robert Koons have both done much recent work in this area and have many arguments (e.g. the grim reaper paradox) to show the reality of a necessarily existing initial cause that doesn’t have any preceding causes, itself.^[3]For a few recent works that give a robust explanation and defense of causal finitism see: – Koons R (2014) A new kalam argument: revenge of the grim reaper. Noûs 48, 256–267. – … Continue reading Pruss points out, though, if causal finitism is true, this alone doesn’t answer the question as to how many first causes there may be.

The next stage of Gel’s argument is that this first cause is either a brute fact with no explanation, or it is a necessary fact that cannot be otherwise. We will see in a bit that choosing the brute fact route will always be less desirable as it will require us to deny other commonly held ideas of philosophy and reason, such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) and the Principle of Causality.

Gel, instead, argues that there is a necessary first cause. Gel then uses the traditional classical theistic arguments to demonstrate this first cause is also necessarily a singular, purely actual being. The reasons for this are many, but a couple are (i) a purely actual being cannot contain any potencies and (ii) it cannot be multiplied. First, if it contained any potencies, there would need to be something other than this supposed first cause that would actualize the potency ‌in it. But there can’t be anything outside of the first cause or it really isn’t the first cause after all. Regarding multipliability, Gel writes:

Given Aquinas’s metaphysics of being (esse), and how it relates to essence as act to potency, a purely actual reality would have to be pure being itself (Ipsum Esse Subsistens) – instead of having an essence really distinct from its esse, its essence would just be pure esse itself. But then, such a thing could not be multipliable, because it could not be subjected to any differentiating feature, as a genus (animal) is multiplied in its species (human) by the addition of a specific difference (rationality) or a species (human) in its individuals (Peter, Mary, and James) by the addition of matter.

There is nothing outside pure being that could act, with respect to it, as a differentiating feature, as the specific difference rationality is outside the genus animal or as matter is outside form, because ‘outside’ pure being there is only non-being, and non-being is nothing. So pure being could not be differentiated, as pure being, into multiple instances of itself, such as pure being A, pure being B, pure being C, and so on. Hence, a purely actual reality that was pure being itself – and such is the classical theist’s picture of God – would have to be unique, out of metaphysical necessity. ^[4]Gel, Enric. How Many and Why? A Question for Graham Oppy that Classical Theism Can Answer. Religious Studies (2021), p. 3

(paragraph breaks added)

Gel’s Argument without Causal Finitism

Some naturalists, and even classical theists, may not accept casual finitism, though. They may say it is possible for the universe to have always existed for an infinite past.^[5]St. Thomas Aquinas even famously differed with St. Bonaventure on whether they thought you philosophically can prove a beginning to the universe. The common appeal to a hierarchical series of causes … Continue reading Regardless, Gel argues that a singular first cause is still required, even if the universe had no temporal beginning. Why? All of reality needs a grounding for things being actualized in the present moment. Rather than a temporal chain of going back into the past, there is need for a hierarchical chain of actualization in the present.^[6]See Feser E (2017) Five Proofs of the Existence of God. San Francisco: Ignatius Press.

You could think of a chandelier being held up by a chain. Each link in the chain derives its power to act on the lower chains from the chains higher up in the series. There need be a first member in this series of chain links to give out the capacity to hold up (or in our case, actualize) things in the series below. Likewise, everything in the world derives its power to actualize things from something else. This cannot go on infinitely.

There needs to be a necessary being that gives out the power of actualization to everything else that exists in order for there to be anything that is actualized at each moment in time; right here, and right now. And we already saw above that this first cause must be pure actuality, for if it contained any potencies itself, they would need actualizing from something outside of it and then the supposed first cause wouldn’t be the first cause at all.

An Appeal to Brute Facts

Despite all this, some naturalists will still say that whatever number of things make up the initial state of existence is just a brute fact.^[7]Gel, Enric. How many and why? A Question for Graham Oppy that Classical Theism Can Answer. Religious Studies (2021), p. 4 Gel points out that whatever number is posited, whether it is 1 or 10⁸⁰, is seemingly arbitrary. There would apparently be no explanation for why it is that number. Here, it seems that pure act theism offers a better solution: there is only one necessary first cause because there could only possibly be one based on the metaphysical analysis of a purely actual ultimate cause. Furthermore, positing brute facts would seem to violate the PSR, to which we now turn.

A Brief Defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR)

The principle of sufficient reason (PSR), in a typical version, says, “there is a sufficient reason or adequate necessary objective explanation for the being of whatever is and for all attributes of any being”. ^[8]Bernard Wuellner, Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, p. 15 Why is a denial of the PSR problematic? There are several reasons, but a few are worth highlighting.

First, the world ‌just seems to operate under the principle that everything that exists has an explanation for how it came to be. Brute facts would violate this principle, positing an unexplainable initial state or infinite state of being.

Second, denying the PSR also seems to lead to a denial of a principle of causality that whatever begins to exist needs a cause.^[9]See Koons, Robert and Pruss, Alexander. Skepticism and the principle of sufficient reason. Philos Stud (2021) 178:1079–1099 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-020-01482-3 p. 1094-1095 If some things simply exist without explanations, there seems to be no reason for why things (e.g. macroscopic objects like bowling balls and rabbits) couldn’t just pop in and out of existence without any cause or explanation. In other words, it would not need to be true that things need a cause in order to begin their existence. And this doesn’t seem to match the world we experience.

Third, Edward Feser argues a denial of the PSR is self-undermining:

Consider that whenever we accept a claim that we take to be rationally justified, we suppose not only that we have a reason for accepting it (in the sense of a rational justification) but also that this reason is the reason why we accept it (in the sense of being the cause or explanation of our accepting it). We suppose that it is because the rational considerations in favor of the claim are good ones that we are moved to assent to the claim. We also suppose that our cognitive faculties track truth and standards of rational argumentation, rather than leading us to embrace conclusions in a way that has no connection to truth or logic. But if PSR is false, we could have no reason for thinking that any of this is really the case.

For all we know, what moves or causes us to assent to a claim might have absolutely nothing to do with the deliverances of our cognitive faculties, and our cognitive faculties themselves might in turn have the deliverances they do in a way that has nothing to do with truth or standards of logic. We might believe what we do for no reason whatsoever, and yet it might also falsely seem, once again for no reason whatsoever, that we do believe what we do on good rational grounds. Now, this would apply to any grounds we might have for doubting PSR as much as it does to any other conclusion we might draw. Hence, to doubt or deny PSR undercuts any grounds we could have for doubting or denying PSR. The rejection of PSR is therefore self-undermining.

Five Proofs of the Existence of God, pg. 149-150, paragraph breaks added

Edward Feser even goes as far to say that to deny the PSR in favor of brute facts “is like placing a book on a shelf, and the shelf on two brackets, but then letting go of the brackets in midair and expecting the book and shelf to stay aloft.” ^[10]Feser, Edward.  5 Proofs of the Existence of God. loc. 505

Conclusions

While the above arguments are not meant to be knock-down proofs of the existence of God, they reveal an advantage that pure act theism has over any brute fact(s) theory of the first cause(s). Of course, there must be a further elaboration on why we should equate a purely actual being with God (and the God of Christianity). The arguments bridging this gap would take us far afield from the discussion above, but the classical theist certianly has much to say on the topic.^[11]For more on a pure-act theist’s views of the necessary attributes of God, see Feser, Edward. 5 Proofs of the Existence of God or Thomas Aquinas Summa Theologiae Prima Pars Q. 3-11.

That aside, it seems if we let any amount of bruteness in the door, there is no reason it shouldn’t contaminate everything, including our ability to know anything. To that end, I echo Christopher Tomaszewski in saying, “I don’t want any bruteness in my worldview.”

Author Bio

Chris Lahn is a devoted Catholic, husband, and father of 2. He runs the blog follyofthecross.com where he enjoys getting into the weeds of many theological and philosophical topics, including soteriology, Thomistic thought, and moral philosophy. Lahn also has a great love for the spiritual and sacramental traditions of the Church. He is a professed disciple in Apostoli Viae, an association of the lay faithful that aims to bring people into deeper union with Jesus through the teachings of the many great saints and spiritual teachers of the Catholic Church.

Resources & Related Podcast Episodes

How Many and Why by Enric Gel

Ep. #205 – Classical Theism, God’s unity, & Oppy’s Naturalism w/ Enric Gel

Ep. #171 – Prof. Tomaszewski responds to Dr. WLC on Divine Simplicity

Ep. #165 – Responding to Ben Watkins’ Opening Statement w/ Pat Flynn

Ep. #111 – How to Think about God w/ Pat Flynn

Ep. #32 – An Interview with Dr. Edward Feser